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Abstract
The Pew Center estimates that as of July 2008, state and local governments in the 
United States had promised current and future retirees $3.34 trillion in benefits but 
had only $2.35 trillion of projected assets to pay for them. The investment losses 
that public employee pension funds experienced during the market downturn of 
2008-09 made the trillion dollar gap much larger. In this paper I discuss how the 
pension funding gap has developed, compare the situation in California with that 
of other states, and discuss the ways in which the state government and local gov-
ernments in California are responding to the increasing strains pension obligations 
place on their finances. I recommend that the constitution of California be amended 
to forbid the state and all local governments from ever again issuing pension obli-
gation bonds, and to forbid the state of California, as well as all local governments 
within the state, from ever again offering their employees defined benefit pension 
plans.
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Introduction
The Pew Center (2010) estimates that as of July 2008, state and local govern-
ments in the United States had promised current and future retirees $3.34 trillion 
in benefits but had only $2.35 trillion of projected assets to pay for them. The in-
vestment losses that public employee pension funds experienced during the market 
downturn of 2008-09 made the trillion dollar gap much larger; recent estimates 
range as high as $3 trillion. State and local governments have also promised retired 
employees generous medical care and other nonpension benefits, but only a handful 
of states have set aside any funds to pay for these obligations.
According to Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), conventional funding formulae are 
too optimistic and lead to overinvestment in risky assets. Bornstein et al. (2010) 
calculate that if CalPERS and other major California retirement funds were to 
adopt more prudent rate-of-return assumptions and rely upon less volatile invest-
ments, funding levels would need to be about 30 percent higher than those currently 
targeted. By their calculations the pension gap in California alone is over half a 
trillion dollars, and thus, larger than the long-term debt of the state and all local 
governments. 
How did we get to this juncture? Does the underfunding of public employee 
retirement benefits constitute a fiscal crisis for state and local governments in Cali-
fornia? How much worse is the situation in California than in other states? How are 
* I would like to thank Mike Aguirre, Steve Erie, Craig Herron, Phil Hoffman, 
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the state government and local governments in this state responding to the increas-
ing strains that pension obligations are placing on their finances? What should they 
be doing instead? Would additional constitutional restrictions on policymaking be 
appropriate and salutary? This paper takes up each of these questions in turn.
Underfunding Public Employee Pension Funds: How Did We Get Here? 
From a Marxist point of view, the looming crisis in financing public employee 
pensions can be seen as arising from the internal contradictions of the welfare state, 
and takes on the inevitability of a Greek tragedy (no pun intended). More specifi-
cally, the granting of generous postemployment benefits to larger numbers of public 
sector workers without simultaneously funding these obligations results from the 
combined, negatively synergistic effects of the following Laws of Political Econ-
omy: 
Wagner’s Law: As national income increases, the public sector’s share of in-
come increases as well. Today Wagner’s Law is not an entirely accurate description 
of the data, in that the public sector’s share of GDP has topped out at around 50% 
in most advanced industrial nations. In any case, the citizens of wealthy countries 
have chosen, through electoral democracy, to grant themselves generous retirement 
pensions and medical care benefits, and have chosen government to be the delivery 
vehicle. Demographic trends that have been operating for generations—declining 
birth rates and increasing life expectancies—have led to burgeoning populations of 
longer living retirees supported by fewer and fewer workers. 
Voters in the United States have expanded the public sector by hiring more 
and more government workers, particularly at the state and local level. There are 
approximately three million federal employees, but over 20 million employees of 
state and local governments. Government employees have come to make up a large 
share of the labor force, and former government employees compose a large and 
growing fraction of all retirees making claims on postemployment benefit plans. 
Four million Californians, or over 10% of the state’s population, are currently 
enrolled in public employee retirement systems. About 60% are currently work-
ing, 25% are beneficiaries, and 15% are former employees who will receive some 
benefits in the future (Chiang 2010). The number of state government retirees and 
covered dependents in California has been increasing by about 4% a year, a rate that 
is far more rapid than the growth of the population or labor force. For many years 
medical care costs have been increasing more rapidly than the costs of goods and 
services in general, and constitute a large and growing share of postemployment 
benefits (Legislative Analyst’s Office 2006). 
Niskanen’s Law: The benefits of government spending accrue disproportion-
ately to public sector employees. According to Niskanen (1971), government agen-
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cies thrive by exploiting the difference between the willingness of citizens and/or 
the politicians they elect to pay for public services, and the actual cost of provision. 
Niskanen’s model has been criticized for making highly stylized assumptions, most 
notably that government agencies behave as if they are unitary actors, that they 
have complete knowledge of their legislators’ demand schedules, and that their 
putative legislative masters know nothing about their costs of production. 
But Niskanen is on the right track. When it comes to such services as protection 
from destructive fire and criminal mayhem, demand from the public is strong and 
inelastic. Agencies may not be able to make take-it-or leave-it offers to the legisla-
tors who fund them, but most are shielded from the rigors of market competition.1
These factors translate into higher salaries and better benefits for public employees, 
particularly when they are unionized. 
Compared to their counterparts in the private sector, public-sector employees 
make more money while working fewer hours, taking more vacation days, and, 
until recently, encountering virtually no risk of being fired or laid off. They retire at 
younger ages with benefits that, by private-sector standards, can be quite generous 
(Edwards 2010). Data from Britain similarly show large public-sector wage and 
benefit premia (Holmes and Lilico 2010). 
True, public- and private-sector jobs are not the same, so simple difference-in-
mean comparisons might be misleading. Bender and Heywood (2010) point out 
that the percentage of employees with college degrees is nearly twice as high in 
the public sector as in the private, and that public-sector workers are older. Once 
wage determinant regressions control for age and education, the public-sector wage 
premium largely disappears. 
But are such “controls” reasonable? That public-sector employees are much 
more likely to have a college degree may only mean that a college degree is used as 
a selection filter to ration excess demand for public-sector jobs. When direct com-
parisons of employees in the same occupation can be made, differences in com-
pensation are impressive. A recent study based upon BLS data reports that public 
school teachers make 61% more on average than private school teachers, and in 
large cities in California public school teachers make twice as much per hour as 
their private school counterparts (Greene and Winters 2010). Public school teach-
ers generally work in more hazardous and chaotic environments, but this cannot 
plausibly account for the entirety of the pay differential. 
In the end, the question of whether government employees deserve higher sala-
ries and better benefits than private-sector workers is not at issue here. What is at is-
sue is that the state of California’s annual costs for retirement benefits are projected 
to increase from around $6 billion today to about $27 billion by the end of the 
decade. Counties, cities, and other local jurisdictions confront increases of similar 
magnitude. The question we face, then, is whether state and local governments can 
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provide a reasonable level of public services while simultaneously paying retirees 
the pension and nonpension benefits that they have been promised. 
Ledyard’s Law: If you cannot steal from future generations, who can you steal 
from? According to Barro (1974), to the extent individuals are ensconced in multi-
generational family structures and voluntarily make altruistic transfers within their 
families, debt is a tax bill that must be paid later. Appropriately discounted, debt 
and taxation are the same thing, and people with rational expectations should re-
gard them as such—a statement that has come to be known as the Ricardian equiva-
lence theorem. 
This is an elegant piece of economic theory, perhaps, but it does not comport 
with reality. To paraphrase Don Michael Corleone, if anything in this life is certain, 
if history has taught us anything, it is that human beings, whether they be politi-
cians or the voters who elect them, strongly prefer debt financing over current taxa-
tion. Ricardo himself was fully aware of this fact: “It would be difficult to convince 
a man possessed of £20,000, or any other sum, that a perpetual payment of £50 per 
annum was equally burdensome with a single tax of £1000. He would have some 
vague notion that the £50 per annum would be paid by posterity, and would not be 
paid by him” (1951, p. 187). 
Ledyard’s Law is simply a statement that human beings seek to enjoy benefits 
today and defer costs until the day after tomorrow. It is one of the cornerstone 
principles of modern political economy. Studies of public opinion have repeatedly 
found voters reluctant to make tradeoffs between taxation and government services. 
They much prefer the cheery premise that they can obtain something for nothing—
or at least that somebody else will pay for it later (Sears and Citrin, 1982). 
What does this have to do with public employee pensions? Plenty. About 80% 
of all public-sector employees are covered under defined benefit plans, wherein an-
nual pension payments = final (or highest) compensation level x years of service x 
benefit factor. In a typical case, a public employee with 30 years of service earning 
a maximum salary of $100k and subject to a benefit factor of 2.5% would receive 
an annual pension of $75k.2 Eligibility requires reaching retirement age, which in 
California is typically 50 for public safety employees (police and firemen) and 55 
to 60 for other employees. 
Underfunding occurs when actuarial projections indicate that current assets, 
future contributions, and investment returns are not sufficient to pay for the benefits 
promised under defined benefit formulae. As indicated earlier, most government 
retirees also receive a monthly payment to cover the cost of medical insurance, but 
these are almost always paid out of general budgets and so are 100% underfunded. 
In contrast, over 80% of all private-sector retirement plans are 401(k) type defined 
contribution plans into which employees and (sometimes) employers make regular 
contributions. Retirement benefits are a function of contributions and investment 
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returns. Contributions cease when employment ceases, no particular level of ben-
efits is guaranteed, and so by design such plans cannot be underfunded.
Properly speaking, then, retirement benefits are deferred compensation, which 
means that underfunding retirement benefit obligations is just another form of 
government borrowing. Government borrowing is not in and of itself undesirable. 
When it comes to infrastructure projects like bridges and highways that yield ben-
efits far into the future, selling bonds and paying them off with interest over time 
produces a better temporal alignment of cost and benefits. But underfunding pub-
lic employee pensions destroys the temporal alignment of costs and benefits. The 
benefits rendered by the service of retired employees have already been realized. 
Future generations are saddled with the bill for these benefits, which they of course 
cannot and will not receive. 
Of all the laws of political economy, Ledyard’s Law is the most powerful. We 
see throughout the world a large and growing gap between the promises that gov-
ernments have made to retired workers and the ability of governments to pay for 
these promises. Being underfunded is a characteristic that public employee pension 
plans in California share with virtually every other government retirement system 
in the world. Indeed, the current extent of underfunding in the Social Security and 
Medicare Trust Funds—on the order of $1014—dwarfs that of state and local gov-
ernment employee pension funds (Jackson 2008).3 
While the current shortfall between public pension fund obligations and pen-
sion fund assets is often blamed on recent investment losses, state and local govern-
ments have underfunded employee pensions even during prosperous times (Pas-
santino and Summers 2005). In his 2008 Letter to Shareholders, which preceded 
the large declines in asset values that public employee pension funds suffered in 
the next few years, the Oracle of Omaha attributes the ultimate cause of pension 
underfunding not to Wall Street, but rather to the moral hazard that is at the heart 
of Ledyard’s Law: 
Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be sur-
passed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in 
many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians 
flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials 
have departed (Buffett 2008, p. 20).
By the way, the reader is advised that if you Google Ledyard’s Law, you will 
not find it. This is because my colleague John Ledyard stated it to me some years 
ago in one of our many fruitful discussions about political economy. Perhaps it 
should instead be called Buchanan’s Law, as formulated in Democracy in Deficit
(1977), or the Sears and Citrin (1982) Something-for-Nothing Principle. I prefer 
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Ledyard’s formulation, however, because I believe it best captures the larcenous 
nature of voters’ and politicians’ calculations.
Do Underfunded Public Employee Pensions Constitute a Fiscal Crisis?
Estimates of the extent to which public employee retirement benefits are un-
derfunded are large and growing rapidly, but these estimates are surrounded by 
great uncertainty. In order to calculate the amount of money a pension fund needs 
to meet its obligations, we need to know the following: (1) how many covered em-
ployees are going to be retiring over time; (2) the cost of the benefits they have been 
promised; (3) how long they and their covered dependents are going to live; (4) the 
amount of money that is going to be contributed into the fund by current and future 
employees, and (5) the fund’s return on investment of assets. 
The number of retirees can be known with a high degree of precision. Actuarial 
tables provide good estimates of life expectancy, although these estimates tend to 
be revised upward over time. Public employee pension benefits are a function of 
final salary, years of service, and benefit factor, and so we can estimate these with 
reasonable accuracy. Future contributions depend upon the outcome of future col-
lective bargaining agreements and future legislation, so this variable is the source 
of significant uncertainty. The real wild card, however, is return on investment, 
which brings us to the fourth Law of Political Economy: 
Morgan’s Law: Asked how he believed the stock market would perform in the 
next year or so, J. P. Morgan is famously quoted as saying, “It will fluctuate.” The 
last three decades in the equity markets have seen the best of times and the worst of 
times. According to the S&P 500/Case-Shiller Index, the compound annual growth 
rate of stock market investments, in real dollars, averaged 12.0% in the 1980s and 
14.9% in the 1990s, making them two of the best decades in the market’s his-
tory. During this period the largest California public employee retirement systems 
(CalPERS and CalSTRS) relied primarily upon returns from stock market invest-
ments to grow their assets (Kogan and McCubbins 2010). 
It is not surprising that it was in 1999 that the California Legislature passed and 
Governor Gray Davis signed SB400, which granted significant upgrades in pension 
benefit factors and retroactive cost of living increases to state government employ-
ees. Based upon past investment returns, SB400 was projected to cost the taxpayers 
nothing. It was also at the tail end of this period (2001) that Los Angeles voters 
approved Charter Amendment A, the measure that created the “Tier 5” benefit lev-
els for police and firemen. Although it now seems like a very long time ago, labor 
markets were very tight at this time and supporters of Charter Amendment A argued 
that better retirement benefits were necessary to attract high-quality candidates to 
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the LAPD. Supporters also asserted that by consolidating four existing pension 
funds, Charter A would actually save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. 
As investors know, however, every mutual fund prospectus comes with the ca-
veat that past performance is no guarantee of future results. From 2000 to 2009, a 
portfolio composed of the S&P 500 lost 3.4% per year on a compounded annual 
basis. The last 10 years thus constitute a significantly worse decade for stock mar-
ket investors than the Depression years of the 1930s. Then real returns averaged a 
meager but nonetheless positive 2.0%. These investment losses did not cause the 
current problem of underfunded public employee pension funds. But they did dra-
matically exacerbate the extent of underfunding in the short-term, thereby bringing 
us much nearer to the day after tomorrow. 
So, does the underfunding of public employee pensions constitute a fiscal cri-
sis? Not necessarily. If the investment returns experienced in the 1980s and 1990s 
were to reappear, the S&P 500 would quadruple in less than 10 years and quadruple 
again in the decade after that. The good old days would be here again, as public em-
ployee pension funds could pay ever-increasing benefits and remain fully funded 
while requiring little or nothing in the way of new contributions. If investment re-
turns are unspectacular, as they surely have been recently, California faces a ticking 
fiscal time bomb (Kogan and McCubbins 2010). 
Given that investment returns cannot be predicted with any useful degree of 
certainty, the Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) prescription of managing funds so as 
to achieve an 80% probability of being 80% funded is the most prudent course of 
action. This entails accepting a lower average rate of return than might (but might 
not) be achieved with a riskier mix of assets. In any case, the vast majority of state 
and local governments have set aside no funds whatsoever to pay for health insur-
ance and other nonpension benefits. These obviously cannot be financed by invest-
ment returns, and are growing rapidly. What we do know with virtual certainty, 
then, is that paying for retiree health insurance and other nonpension benefits while 
simultaneously backfilling underfunded pension funds will place an ever-worsen-
ing strain on state and local governments that are already hard pressed to maintain 
present levels of services to their citizens.
How Much Worse Is California Than Other States?
Because of extensive media coverage of ongoing budgetary shortfalls, the fail-
ure of the state government to pass budgets on time, and a cultural tendency to-
ward self-flagellation, California is often identified as the worst case scenario of 
borrowing and underfunding, providing a cautionary tale of How Bad It Can Get. 
Will (2010), for example, describes Los Angeles as a place “where the climate is 
Mediterranean and the fiscal climate Greek.” The major public employee unions—
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the California Service Employees International Union, the California Teachers As-
sociation, the California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, and the unions rep-
resenting the prison guards and firefighters—are regarded as especially powerful 
and insatiable (Greenhut 2009). Large numbers of Democrats serving in the state 
legislature and on city councils, reflective of this blue state’s general ideological 
leanings, are seen to function primarily as their minions (Malanga 2010). Another 
explanation for why things are so bad in California is that Ledyard’s Law is particu-
larly powerful here; underfunding is indicative of a general pathological tendency 
toward borrowing, and that states whose governments have issued the most debt, 
e.g., California, are also the most prone toward underfunding pension obligations 
(Gelinas 2010). 
There is, to begin with, much that is unhelpful, if not wrongheaded, about blam-
ing the underfunding of public employee pension funds on plundering labor unions 
and feckless legislators. We would, of course, expect the unionization of public 
employees to lead to higher pay and better benefits. As Farber (1986) explains, 
“Unions are fundamentally organizations that seek to create or capture monopoly 
rents available in an industry” (p. 1044). Obtaining higher wages and more benefits 
for their members is what unions do. We might as well blame carnivores for eating 
smaller animals. But why would public employee unions have any interest whatso-
ever in having their pension funds become underfunded? This makes no sense, as 
this is where the money for their members’ pensions comes from! 
Second, while our elected officials may in fact be feckless, there is no reason 
to believe that they are any more feckless than the voters who elected them. As 
indicated earlier, when voter approval was required to increase public employee 
pension benefits (as in Los Angeles in 2001), voter approval was forthcoming. We 
are emerging, albeit slowly and reluctantly, from a long period of abysmal saving 
rates during which it became common for Americans to max out their credit cards, 
borrow as much as possible against the equity in their house, and put no money 
away for retirement. Ledyard’s Law applies at least as strongly to voters as to the 
politicians they elect. 
As it turns out, the portrayal of California as a case study in profligacy is not an 
accurate one. According to the Pew Center’s figures, states varied dramatically as of 
2008 in the extent to which their public employee pension funds were underfunded. 
Public employee pensions in some states, including the large states of Florida and 
New York, were fully funded, and California was also in relatively good shape. The 
three major public employee pension funds (CALPERS, CALSTRS, and UCRS) 
were 13.1% underfunded, which was significantly better than the national average 
of 19.4 %, and better than 32 other states. To be sure, these funds subsequently 
lost approximately one fourth of their value, but the other states’ public employee 
pension funds suffered large losses as well. When it comes to underfunding public 
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employee pensions the real basket case is Illinois, not California. The Pew Center’s 
figures indicate that in 2008 the major public employee retirement funds in Illinois 
were 46% underfunded—the worst level of all 50 states. 
To gain some additional insight into the role played by public employee unions 
and other factors in pensions and pension funding, some simple regression analyses 
were performed on state-level data. The first equation seeks to explain variation 
across states in public employee compensation, as measured by the average annual 
wages and benefits received by full-time state and local government employees in 
2008. The dependent variable in the second equation is the amount by which major 
public employee pension funds are underfunded, expressed as a percentage of the 
funds’ total amount of obligations to current and future retirees. These two variables 
were regressed upon average per capita personal income, the percent of state and 
local government employees who belonged to labor unions, Erikson et al.’s (1993) 
measure of state ideology, and per capita long-term debt issued by state and local 
governments. Results are reported in Table 1. The top number in each entry is the 
estimated regression coefficient; the number in parentheses below is the standard 
error. Coefficients that are twice the size of the standard error can be regarded as 
statistically significant. 
The results in the first column in Table 1 indicate that public employee unions 
do what they are supposed to do—higher levels of unionization lead to higher levels 
of compensation. The coefficient for this variable indicates that unionizing an ad-
ditional 10% of government workers in a state would lead to an increase of $1,560 
in additional annual compensation per employee. Higher state per capita personal 
income, which probably reflects differences in cost of living as well as income, also 
increases public employee compensation. However, public employee compensa-
tion was not related to state ideology or to a general proclivity for borrowing, at 
least as registered by the level of per capita long-term indebtedness. 
The R2 of .57 indicates that this simple model accounts for over half the vari-
ation in public employee compensation, but there is still much variation that is 
not accounted for. According to Edwards (2010), in 2008 the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis found that California public employees earned an average of $86,417, 
making them the highest paid in the nation. This is due in part to California’s rela-
tively high level of per capita personal income (11th highest among all states) and 
strength of public employee unions (62% of state and local government employees 
belonged to a union, which was the 9th highest figure). Analysis of residuals, how-
ever, reveals that state and local government employees in California receive over 
$15,000 more than can be accounted for by these variables. Feel free to speculate 
as to the reasons why this is the case. 
Coefficients associated with the second equation, in contrast, indicate that strong 
unions are not the authors of underfunding. Indeed, none of the variables specified 
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in this equation had any impact whatsoever on the extent to which public employee 
pension funds were underfunded. Pension funds in some states are substantially 
more underfunded than in other states, but this is not due to the strength of their 
public employee unions, to their ideological tendencies, or to a general tendency 
toward overborrowing as reflected in high levels of bonded indebtedness. 
Contrary to California’s portrayal in the media, then, the data indicate that pub-
lic employee pension funds are in better overall shape here than in most states. 
Data sources: Employee compensation and unionization figures are from Edwards (2010). Data 
on pension fund obligations and underfunding are from the Pew Center (2010). The source of the 
state ideology measure is Erickson et al (1993). Per capita personal income (from 2007) is taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 Statistical Abstract. Per capita long-term debt figures are taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 State and Local Government Finances.
Table 1. Effect of Unionization and State Ideology Upon Employee 
Compensation and Pension Underfunding
Employee Compensation Unfunded Pension Obligations
C 42970
(8487)
7.02
(19.3)
Per capita income 432
(197)
.197
(.447)
Percent union 156
(63)
-.018
(.144)
Ideology 121
(152)
-.024
(.344)
Per capita debt 70
(528)
.686
(1.20)
R2 .57 .02
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What data aggregated to the state level do not reveal is that local governments in 
California face greater problems than the state government. Moreover, some local 
governments face more severe problems going forward than others. Vallejo de-
clared bankruptcy in 2008. Oakland and other smaller cities in the Bay Area have 
badly underfunded pension funds and rapidly growing obligations, but so do the 
two largest cities in the state. The city of Los Angeles now devotes over 25% of its 
payroll to pension fund contributions, and allocates another $300 million to retiree 
health care. In the next four years pension and nonpension costs are set to increase 
by an additional $2.5 billion, while projected revenue, even under rosy scenario 
projections, is seen to grow from $4.3 billion to $4.75 billion per year (Riordan and 
Ruralcava 2010; Goichman and Ralston 2010). 
Increased pension costs, in short, will greatly outpace any conceivable increase 
in revenue. San Diego is currently making large annual payments on a 20-year 
amortization schedule to backfill an unfunded liability of more than $2 billion in its 
public employee pension funds, and next year will inject 40 cents per every dollar 
of payroll into its pension system (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie 2010). Cities like 
Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego can continue to meet their employee pension 
obligations. Or they can provide a reasonable level of services to their citizens. It is 
hard to see how they will be able to continue doing both. 
The Response of State and Local Governments to 
Increasing Employee Retirement Costs 
The budget of a state or local government, be it a city, school district, or special 
service district, can be characterized in the following way:
Rt + Rb + Rf = Erb + Ecs
where Rt is revenue from taxes and fees, Rb is revenue from borrowing, Rf is rev-
enue received from the federal government, Erb is expenditures on retirement ben-
efits, and Ecs is expenditures on current services. The problem that state and local 
governments face is to balance this equation when one of the terms—retirement 
benefit expenditures—is large and increasing rapidly. Over the past year alone the 
state of California has needed to increase its contribution to CalPERS by 18%, from 
$3.3 billion to $3.9 billion, and by similar amounts for CalSTRS and UCRS (but 
not to worry—the money is to come from transportation and other special funds, 
and will be paid back, presumably, the day after tomorrow). Expenditures on retiree 
medical benefits are slated to increase by 9% to $1.4 billion. Counties, cities, and 
school districts must also make much larger expenditures on retiree benefits for the 
11
Kiewiet: The Day After Tomorrow:  The Politics of Public Employee Benefits
coming year. And retirement benefit expenditures are projected to increase for as 
long as one cares to project.
The first alternative to consider is to pay for the growing costs of retiree ben-
efits by increasing taxes, but this does not look particularly promising. The severe 
downturn in the California economy has led to a sharp decline in tax revenue over 
the past few years. The economy will eventually improve and tax revenue will in-
crease, but it could be a while before that happens. There is also the problem that 
increasing state sales and income tax rates may end up yielding less tax revenue, as 
doing so would encourage even more job-creating private firms to flee to states with 
more congenial tax and regulatory regimes. 
Local governments in California face an additional hurdle in the quest for more 
revenue in that they have little ability to influence the amount of money they take 
in through taxation. They receive a share of state income and sales tax revenue on 
a formulaic basis, and cannot directly alter property tax rates. What they can do to 
collect tax revenue over and above the Proposition 13 default level is to impose a 
parcel tax. This type of levy requires the approval of two-thirds of the voters in their 
jurisdiction. About one fourth of the school districts in the state (typically wealthy 
ones like San Marino and Palo Alto) currently have a parcel tax in place, as do a few 
cities and some special service districts. As shown in Table 2, voters in California 
have approved 56 of the 79 parcel tax proposals put before them since the begin-
ning of 2009, so super-majority approval is not an insurmountable obstacle even 
during hard economic times. 
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the 71% approval rate for parcel 
tax elections over the past few years that all local governments have a good chance 
of winning approval for a parcel tax. Cities, school districts, or other jurisdictions 
seeking a parcel tax must pay for the administration of the election, and so these 
proposals are presumably put before the voters only when prospects for approval 
are quite good. Most parcel taxes are modest; of the 56 that were approved in 2009-
10, only 20 yielded a tax in excess of $200 annually per single-family residence. 
The entries in Table 2 also show that voters in 2009-10 were much more likely to 
approve measures to extend or modestly increase existing parcel taxes (28 of 31) 
than they were to approve a new tax (28 of 48). For these reasons local governments 
in California should not count on the parcel tax to provide significant amounts of 
new revenue.
In addition to income, sales, and property taxes, revenue is raised through fees, 
charges, and fines. In FY2008 state and local governments in California collected 
about 24% of their total revenue from tuition at public colleges and universities, 
charges for use of public hospitals, sewerage and waste treatment fees, and similar 
payments for services. This figure is virtually identical to the national average, but 
the 8.2% share of revenue derived from public utilities was considerably higher 
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than the 5% national average (see Cain and Noll 2010 for an extensive set of com-
parisons of California revenues and expenditures with those of other states). 
In response to their budgetary difficulties, the state and local governments in 
this state have sharply increased many of these charges, and are instituting new 
charges. Among other things, citizens of some California cities are now charged for 
calling 911, or for cleanup costs after traffic accidents. The state and most cities in 
California have significantly increased fines for parking and moving violations, and 
are enforcing parking and traffic regulations more aggressively. Is there someone 
out there who has not noticed this? 
How much additional revenue these initiatives will yield depends upon how 
much state and local governments actually collect from those who have been fined. 
A recent audit in Los Angeles found that the city collected only about half of the 
$250 million in parking citations written last year (McDonnell 2010). On the whole, 
higher fees, charges, and fines should yield more in terms of increased revenue than 
taxes per se. But it is still unrealistic to believe that increases in revenue from fees, 
charges, and fines will close more than a small portion of the pension funding gap. 
The second term on the revenue side of the budget equation is borrowing, which 
is how the federal government currently obtains over 40 cents of every dollar going 
into its coffers. State and local governments face something vaguely resembling a 
balanced budget requirement, at least over the short and medium term, and so face 
much tighter constraints on borrowing. They can, however, issue long-term bonds, 
backed by either the taxing power of the government (general obligation bonds) or 
by a specific stream of revenue (e.g., parking fees). 
Bond financing has conventionally been used to fund major infrastructure proj-
ects. Some state and local governments have also issued long-term bonds to cover 
unfunded pension obligations, seeking thereby to push the day of fiscal reckoning 
out to the day after the day after tomorrow. State and local governments in Cali-
Table 2. Parcel Tax Elections in California, 2009-10
Approved Failed
School Districts: 
    Renew Existing Tax  9  1
    Increase Existing Tax 11  2
    New Tax 16 13
Cities and Special Districts:
    Renew Existing Tax  8  0
    New Tax 12  7
Total 56 23
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fornia have issued about $14 billion in pension obligation bonds over the past two 
decades. This is more than any other state, but five other states have issued more on 
a per capital basis (Munnell et al. 2010). 
Not to put too fine a point on it, issuing pension obligation bonds is nuts. First, 
borrowing of this nature runs directly contrary to the traditional public finance ra-
tionale for long-term debt financing. Because major infrastructure payments like 
bridges and highways yield a flow of benefits that extend far into the future, selling 
bonds and paying them off over time produces a better temporal alignment of cost 
and benefits. As noted earlier, borrowing to backfill underfunded pension funds, 
like underfunding pensions in the first place, turns this logic on its head. The ben-
efits rendered by the service of retired employees have already been realized, but 
future generations are being saddled with the bill. 
This is, of course, what Ledyard’s Law is all about. Issuing pension obliga-
tion bonds merely replaces unfunded pension liabilities with long-term debt. It is 
equivalent to taking an advance on a new credit card in order to continue making 
payments on the credit cards one already has. The U.S. Treasury regards this exer-
cise, correctly, as one of risk arbitrage. This means that interest paid on such bonds 
is taxable, so the interest rates the issuing governments must pay for these bonds is 
correspondingly higher than for conventional, tax-free municipal bonds. The risk 
premia demanded by investors also increases the cost of this money.
The record of governments that have made heavy use of this dubious practice is 
not encouraging. Turning to pension obligation bonds in the 1990s in a gamble for 
redemption, the city of Pittsburgh only dug itself deeper into the hole. It currently 
devotes over 20% of its budget to debt service, and its major pension funds have 
less than 30% of the assets they need to meet future obligations (McKee 2009). 
Closer to home, the city of Pasadena will need to devote roughly 10% of its budget 
in coming years on paying off $100 million of pension obligation bonds issued in 
1999 (Armstrong 2010). 
The state of Illinois borrowed $10 billion in pension obligation bonds in 2003, 
but, as noted previously, its public employee pension funds are more severely un-
derfunded than those of any other state. The Chicago Transit Authority issued $1.9 
billion in pension obligation bonds in 2007, but, like Pittsburgh, found that risk 
arbitrage is harder than it looks. It has needed to pay a high rate of interest to 
bondholders, while experiencing losses on the investments made with the money 
it borrowed. In early 2008 the state of Connecticut needed to pay an interest rate 
of nearly 5.9% to attract investors to its $2.2 billion pension obligation bond issue, 
and I am pretty sure they have not realized the 8.5% return that they had projected 
to achieve on investing the proceeds. Illinois recently returned to the market for an-
other $3.5 billion in pension obligation bonds, and may try for more later this year. 
Maybe they will get lucky. Maybe they won’t.4 
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In managing the budgetary demands of paying for steadily increasing employee 
retirement benefits, the revenue side of the equation thus offers little help. Sig-
nificant increases in tax revenues cannot be counted upon, and borrowing to cover 
unfunded pension liabilities, is, in the words of former New Jersey governor John 
Corzine, “the dumbest idea I ever heard” (quoted in Munnell et al. 2010). 
The third term on the left hand side of the budget equation is revenue received 
from the federal government. In fiscal year 2008, 16.3% ($58 billion out of $354 
billion), or slightly more than one sixth of all state and local government revenue 
in California, came from Washington. The federal government was the source of 
14% of California state and local government revenue in 1998 and 14.8% in 2004, 
so federal assistance was becoming slightly more important as a source of revenue 
in the decade before the Great Downturn. 
The $787 billion stimulus package that was enacted in 2009 included an addi-
tional $11.2 billion for California for MediCal, $6 billion for school districts, and 
$220 million for law enforcement. This large infusion of federal funds surely staved 
off large-scale layoffs of state and local government employees, but it was a tempo-
rizing measure at best. A follow-up bill passed recently that provides an additional 
year of bailout money for Medicaid and for school districts is much smaller than 
the 2009 bill, and required tax increases and cuts in food stamps to gain passage. 
As indicated earlier, the Social Security and Medicare programs present the federal 
government with funding problems of its own that are many times worse than the 
underfunding of state and local government employee retirement benefits. 
It is highly improbable, then, that significant amounts of bailout money will 
continue to flow from Washington. In any case, state and local governments have 
no control over the amount of revenue they receive from the federal government. 
One does not need to ride a Streetcar Named Desire to know that it is unwise to 
rely upon the kindness of strangers. As in the case of the other two revenue sources 
considered, revenue received from the federal government will not begin to close 
the gap between the retirement benefits that public employees have been promised 
and the funds that state and local governments have to pay for them. 
An additional term that might be included on the revenue side of the budget 
equation for local governments is the potential for being bailed out by the state 
government. In the past, states have rescued cities in deep financial distress by 
paying their vendors and guaranteeing their debt obligations while simultaneously 
placing them in receivership. In 1975, for instance, the state of New York created 
and funded the Municipal Assistance Corporation to assume control of New York 
City’s finances when that city stood on the brink of insolvency. 
In the context of today’s budgetary climate, a bailout of local governments by 
the state government of California would be a terrible idea—something akin to a 
small boat that is sinking being rescued by a ship that is itself taking on water. It is, 
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in fact, an even worse idea than the boat analogy implies, as the specter of moral 
hazard once again rears its ugly head. This is because the prospect of a bailout less-
ens the incentive to make responsible decisions and corrective changes. Why worry 
about taking on more debt and additional pension obligations if the state or federal 
government will bail us out when we can’t make the payments? 
The next alternative to consider in attacking the problem of increasingly oner-
ous retirement benefit expenditures is on the expenditure side, and that is the di-
rect approach of reducing retirement benefit expenditures—or at least the rate of 
increase in retirement benefit expenditures. Like the revenue-based alternatives, 
however, this one runs rather quickly into a dead end. States vary in terms of the 
precise legal justification that is invoked, but retirees covered by public employee 
pension plans have strong legal and constitutional guarantees that their pension 
benefits will never be reduced. Some states treat pensions as property, and thus pro-
tect them under the just compensation and due process guarantees of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In California, as in most other states, pension benefits are 
considered as part of the contract that is struck between employer and employee at 
the moment employment commences. Such contracts are typically created through 
collective bargaining agreements, but the courts have ruled that benefits defined by 
statute, as they must be in California, must be afforded contract status as well.5 
In any case, these agreements are protected by the Contracts Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits states from taking actions that impair contracts. Cal-
ifornia’s constitution has a contract clause of its own and specifically guarantees 
that public employees will receive the retirement benefits they have been promised. 
Because public employee compensation in California must be set by statute, the 
matter of retirement benefits raises the thorny constitutional question of the extent 
to which an elected body can prevent future versions of itself from altering policy 
in the future. This necessarily occurs when contractually guaranteed vesting in pen-
sion benefits are created. Locking in policy in this manner constrains the ability 
of elected officials to change policy in response to changing conditions, and runs 
counter to traditional interpretations of democratic theory.
At present, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether retired public employ-
ees have the same contractual protections when it comes to other postemployment 
benefits (OPEBS), most notably their health care benefits. The County Employee 
Retirement Act of 1937 explicitly states that in choosing to provide such benefits, 
county governments do not grant vested rights in these benefits, but in Thorning 
vs. Hollister School District (1993) the court ruled that an implied contract existed, 
thus creating vested rights. 
In 2006 the Orange County Board of Supervisors voted to place retirees, who 
had previously benefited from inclusion in the same risk pool as current employ-
ees, into a separate risk pool. This effectively reduced their health care benefits by 
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an average of $160 a month. The district court ruled against the retirees in their 
subsequent lawsuit, noting, among other things, that, “the requirement to provide 
lifetime healthcare benefits does not establish a right to a specific method of rate 
setting” (quoted in Yeung 2010). In the end state and local governments may be 
given some ability to reduce retirees’ nonpension benefits, particularly when the 
only argument for the existence of an implicit contract is that the employer has been 
providing a particular set of benefits for a long time. This case has recently been 
handed over to the California Supreme Court, and years of litigation are likely to 
ensue regardless of the verdict. 
 In contrast to the privileged status of retirees, current employees may be sub-
ject to adverse changes in the parameters of their retirement plans. In an excellent 
primer on the legal basis of public employee pension plans, Monahan (2010) re-
ports that the courts have allowed state and local governments to make such modi-
fications as long as they come with offsetting benefits. In Houghton v. City of Long 
Beach (1958) a new requirement that workers contribute 2% of their salary to their 
retirement fund was offset by the benefit that the currently insolvent plan would be 
made solvent (p. 21). Recently, Governor Schwarzenegger has reached agreement 
with several public employee unions to increase their employee contributions. 
Some state and local governments have been able to increase the minimum age 
of benefit eligibility for employees who are more than five years away from retire-
ment (Monahan 2010, p. 26). So far, however, reductions of any kind in the actual 
retirement benefits that have been promised to current government workers have 
remained off the table. 
New hires, in contrast, are fair game. State and local governments throughout 
the country have responded to the fiscal duress they are currently enduring by re-
ducing any and all parameters of the retirement benefit equation (Mendel 2010). 
Compared to current workers and retirees, newly hired workers must contribute 
a larger percentage of their pay in return for benefits that are a smaller percentage 
of their final salary. They must also reach an older chronological age before they 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits; a typical reform is to increase the 
retirement age from 50 to 55 for police, firemen, and other public safety workers 
and from 55 to 60 (or 65, or even, as in Illinois, to 67). 
Some states, like West Virginia, have reduced or even eliminated medical insur-
ance coverage prior to eligibility for Medicare. In Utah new employees no longer 
are covered by a defined benefit plan, but instead, like the vast majority of workers 
in the private sector, by either a defined contribution or “hybrid” plan. The city of 
San Diego and Orange County also provide new hires with hybrid plans that have 
both defined contribution and defined benefit elements. 
It is possible that retrenchment of current retirees’ benefits might meet legal 
muster if they were achieved as part of a collective bargaining agreement. In Vil-
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lage of Fairpoint vs. Newman (1982) the court ruled that unilateral amendments to 
a pension plan are not acceptable, but employers and the unions are free to negoti-
ate and could agree upon changes (Monahan 2010, p. 10). Presumably the courts 
would also have to agree that any reductions in current retiree benefits were offset 
by the benefit of restoring an insolvent pension fund to solvency. But public em-
ployee unions would be loath to sign on to such an agreement. First, many public 
employee unions, like private-sector unions, are dominated by retirees and soon-to-
be retirees to such an extent that we can view them purely as pension protectors.6
Future hires, in contrast, do not vote in union elections. Perhaps the representative 
union member recognizes that the benefits he is now receiving come out of the 
wallets of future hires—but try telling him that is a bad thing. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the reputation of the union is at stake. If a union cannot defend the benefits 
won for previous workers who are now retired, why would current workers believe 
that the union can protect them?
All indications are that public-sector unions will follow the same course as the 
private-sector unions that have withered away in this country, and accept “two-tier” 
pay systems that entail large reductions in compensation for new workers in order 
to protect existing pension benefits. They will eat their young. It is hard to know 
exactly how stark a trade-off public employee unions are willing to make between 
the interests of retirees and new hires. If the history of the United Auto Workers 
is any guide, an agreement reducing new hire compensation by 10% and retiree 
benefits by 1.0% would be rejected in favor of an agreement that reduces new hire 
compensation by 50% but keeps benefits for current retirees at current levels. 
By concentrating the retrenchment of employee retirement benefits on new 
hires, state and local governments avoid impairing contracts and, thus, stay out of 
court. But in so doing they will have to wait for decades before realizing significant 
reductions in retirement benefit expenditures. The current wave of “pension re-
forms” are systematic attempts to avoid real reform, or to at least to delay it as much 
as possible. They do nothing to alter the upward trajectory of retirement benefit 
expenditures that state and local governments must confront over the next several 
years. Pension reforms that apply only to new hires mirror and reinforce what cur-
rent pension systems do, and that is to borrow from the future in order to maintain 
benefits for current retirees at high and possibly unsustainable levels. 
The fifth and last term in the budget equation is expenditures on current servic-
es. Over the past few years local governments in California have made significant 
reductions in such expenditures (Sun 2009). These spending cuts have been made 
in response to the acute crisis precipitated by a significant drop in tax receipts, but 
they provide a guide as to what course of action counties, cities, and school dis-
tricts are likely to follow in responding to chronic budgetary duress due to steadily 
increasing expenditures on retirement benefits. 
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In evaluating the impact of reduced spending on current services it is useful 
to recall Niskanen’s Law: government agencies feed on the surplus that is the dif-
ference between the cost of providing public services and the willingness of the 
citizenry (or their elected representatives) to pay for them. The value of the services 
citizens receive from government agencies is not, in other words, identical in value 
to the amount of money government agencies spend. Sheltered from the disciplin-
ary forces of market competition, government agencies can, thus, possess much in 
the way of slack resources. 
In principle, this is good news. Budgetary duress could induce government 
agencies to utilize and/or eliminate their slack resources to thereby achieve effi-
ciency gains in service delivery. Neither individuals nor organizations spend much 
time or effort pursuing gains in efficiency unless they are truly forced to do so. If 
there is a silver lining here, it is that state and local governments should be able to 
reduce expenditures significantly before citizens notice a decline in services. At a 
minimum, budgetary duress heightens awareness of the more egregious examples 
of excessive spending on current services as well as pension benefits. The embat-
tled citizens of Bell (pop. 36,552), for example, recently discovered that their top 
city administrators were earning salaries (and pensions) considerably larger than 
those earned by similarly placed administrators in the city of Los Angeles (popula-
tion 3,831,868).7 
Gains in service delivery efficiency can come from innovation, and many 
government agencies have displayed ingenuity in doing more with less. The city 
of Lakewood, Washington, for instance, chose not to buy new police cars, but to 
overhaul its existing fleet of Crown Victorias and retrofit them with a custom per-
formance package. This option cost about half as much as buying new, and the 
revamped cars were more powerful, safer, and more durable than the 2010 models 
(Glenn 2010). Local governments can provide more and better service at lower 
prices by bidding out garbage removal and other tasks to private firms (Dubin and 
Navarro 1988). 
A third source of efficiency is consolidation. By firing all its employees and 
contracting out the provision of all public services to Los Angeles County and to 
neighboring cities, the city of Maywood found it could obtain better services for its 
citizens at lower cost (Vives et al. 2010). 
The extreme case of consolidation is disincorporation, in which a city turns 
over responsibility for all services to the county and ceases to exist as a legal entity 
(Scott 2010).
More generally, budgetary duress should encourage voters and their representa-
tives to take a closer, more critical look at the information emanating from public 
employee unions concerning the relationship between expenditures and services 
provided. Policemen, for example, interact with unpleasant people that most of us 
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strongly prefer avoiding, and for that reason deserve some wage and benefit premia. 
They experience, in most years, an on-the-job fatality rate of around 20 per hundred 
thousand, which is considerably higher than the average of 3.6 per hundred thou-
sand for all occupations. 
But, there are many jobs that are much more dangerous (farmers, fishermen, 
loggers, iron workers, truck drivers) and pay far less. Moreover, policemen do not, 
on average, die young as a consequence of their career choice. Life expectancy of 
public safety employees (police and firemen) at time of retirement is indistinguish-
able from that of government employees in general (Greenhut 2009). In a similar 
vein, the California Federation of Teachers has long championed the idea that the 
key to better education is smaller class size. The state of California has spent tens of 
billions of dollars to hire more teachers in order to reduce average class size in the 
public schools. It has been extremely difficult, however, to reliably establish a caus-
al relationship between class size and educational attainment (Hanushek 1999). 
All in all, it is unwise to expect too much from state and local government 
efforts to eliminate inefficiency (also known as waste, fraud, and abuse), assum-
ing that they are motivated or compelled to do so. Among other things, collective 
bargaining agreements make it difficult for state and local governments to fire, 
demote, or discipline employees for being troublesome or unproductive. It is virtu-
ally impossible, for example, to fire a teacher because they are bad at teaching. At 
some point, reductions in expenditures must result in real reduction in services that 
disproportionately affect those who disproportionately rely upon them—the poor 
and disadvantaged. 
Because the bulk of spending on current services is devoted to the wages paid 
to employees performing these services, cuts in such expenditures are achieved 
primarily by cutting jobs and cutting wages. State and local government employees 
are contractually guaranteed the pension benefits that they have been promised, but 
no such guarantees apply to the salary or wages they are paid, to how many hours 
they work, or even to continued employment (Monahan 2010, p. 32). While it is 
extremely difficult, as noted above, to cut the pay or to fire public employees for 
being troublesome and unproductive, it is much less difficult to cut wages across 
the board, and much less difficult to get rid of those who lack seniority. 
Public employees have long enjoyed a high level of job security—the private 
sector has shed 8 million jobs over the past few years and the public sector almost 
none—but this is starting to change. A recent study conducted for the National 
League of Cities reports that during the past year 71% of the cities surveyed had 
frozen hiring, 51% had frozen or cut wages, 25% had laid off employees, and 19% 
had given their employees furlough days. Over a fifth had made cuts in spending 
on police and fire protection. Officials in half the cities surveyed expected to make 
20
California Journal of Politics and Policy, Vol. 2 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 3
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1115
additional cuts in jobs and wages as tax revenues continued to lag (McFarland 
2010). 
By not hiring new employees, laying off current employees, and reducing wag-
es, state and local governments will also reduce future expenditures on retirement 
benefits. Eventually there will be fewer public employees retiring, and, because 
their final years of compensation will presumably be lower, they will receive small-
er pension payments. Such savings will, over time, bend the cost curve on retire-
ment benefits downward. 
Reducing retirement benefit expenditures in this way, however, comes at con-
siderable cost. For the next couple of decades at least, in order to pay retirees the 
benefits they were promised, what services state and local governments continue to 
provide will be generated by a smaller, overstretched work force receiving lower 
wages and benefits than the previous generation of employees. What we can antici-
pate for many years down the road, particularly in those cities that have especially 
large pension funding gaps, is a steady degradation in public services combined 
with rising fees, charges, and fines.
Retirement Benefit Expenditures Revisited 
Consideration of the various approaches that might be taken to address the 
problem of funding public employee retirement benefits is disheartening. State and 
local governments are contractually obligated to pay retirees the pension benefits 
they were promised on the day they were hired. At some point some of them may be 
able to scale back their health care benefits, but this depends upon the outcome of 
litigation that could wind its way through the courts for a long time. As retirement 
benefit expenditures inexorably increase and revenue growth remains an uncertain 
prospect at best, the arithmetic of the budget equation dictates that the primary re-
sponse of state and local governments will be to continue to reduce expenditures on 
current services. Rationally, we should seek to avoid this corner solution and make 
more reasonable trade-offs between the benefits promised to retired employees and 
the compensation received by current employees. 
But how could this possibly be achieved? Logically, there is but one way for 
state and local governments to reduce the pensions and other benefits that they are 
contractually obligated to pay retired workers: break the contract. They could do so 
by simply defaulting on their payments. Cities like Los Angeles and San Diego that 
have their own pension funds could continue paying pensions until the funds run 
out of money and then stop. The state of California and local governments in the 
CalPERS system, as well as public school districts that pay into CalSTRS, could 
engage in de facto default by decreasing or halting entirely the money they pay into 
these funds. 
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According to Monahan (2010), there are legal grounds for breach of contract 
by public agencies. Breach can be “justified by an important public purpose and if 
the action taken to advance the public interest is reasonable and necessary” (p. 6). 
Second, state and local governments always retains the power to amend contracts 
if doing so is necessary to exercise their inherent police powers in order to protect 
the safety and well-being of the citizenry (p. 7).
There is abundant precedent for state and local governments failing to abide 
by the terms of their contracts, at least in the area of bonded indebtedness. Several 
states defaulted on their bonds in the 1830s, and after the Depression of 1873 about 
one fourth of all municipal bonded indebtedness was in default. New York City 
defaulted on its bonds in 1975, Cleveland in 1978, the Washington Public Power 
Supply System in 1983. Litvack and McDermott (2003) report that between 1980 
and 2002 there were 2,339 instances of local governments defaulting on bonds to-
taling $32.8 billion in face value.
Monahan (2010) indicates that in practice it is much more difficult to stiff re-
tired public employees than bondholders. Specifically, the argument that it would 
be more beneficial to spend money on providing current services than to pay ben-
efits to retired employees, which is the primary motivation for retrenching retire-
ment benefit expenditures, has been rejected by the Supreme Court:
Merely because the governmental actor believes that money can be better spent or should now be con-
served does not provide a sufficient interest to impair the obligation of contract. If a State could reduce 
its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important 
public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all (U.S. Trust Co .v. New Jersey 
1977, cited by Monahan 2010, p. 26). 
 Simply defaulting on retirement benefit payments thus does not appear to be a 
workable option. As indicated earlier, it might be possible for a state or local gov-
ernment to seek reductions in retirement benefits through a collective bargaining 
agreement, but this assumes that the government would be able to convince the 
court that the disadvantages of benefit reductions are offset by the benefits of mak-
ing an insolvent pension plan solvent. Whether this argument could be stretched to 
apply to retirees in addition to current employees is hard to know, but it would be a 
major additional hurdle to clear. For these reasons, local governments choosing to 
renege on contractually guaranteed retirement benefits will almost surely declare 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
In the private sector, bankruptcy has served a number of functions. It allows 
firms or parts of firms that are otherwise economically viable “going concerns” to 
get a fresh start by negotiating new terms with their creditors and reorganizing their 
operations. For those that are not viable, it allows for an orderly liquidation of assets 
and prevents opportunistic behavior on the part of the firm’s principals.8 Chapter 9 
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bankruptcy, in contrast, does not allow for disincorporation or the liquidation of as-
sets (McConnell and Picker 1993). Furthermore, the separation of powers doctrine 
forbids courts or court-appointed agents to act as trustees or debtors-in-possession 
and to thereby directly intervene into the ongoing policymaking processes of the 
local government. 
Chapter 9 is instead solely a mechanism for obtaining relief from debt burdens 
that cannot be paid. Private and public bankruptcy also differ in the status they 
afford to collective bargaining agreements (McConnell and Picker 1993, p. 467). 
Under Chapter 11, private debtors have little or no ability to renege on collective 
bargaining agreements, while under Chapter 9 local governments may do precisely 
that, as Judge Michael McManus clearly affirmed in the 2008 Vallejo bankruptcy 
case. 
Since the creation of Chapter 9 during the Great Depression, fewer than 500 
local governments have declared bankruptcy, and almost all of them were special 
districts and not cities or counties. These jurisdictions typically filed for Chapter 
9 protection after being hit with a personal injury or wrongful death award that 
was far in excess of what they could conceivably pay. When Vallejo, California, 
declared bankruptcy in 2008, however, it was in large part because the city could 
not pay retirement benefits that included $135 million for medical care and the $84 
million it owed to CalPERS. In court, Vallejo pointed to “hundreds of millions of 
dollars in debt that the city shoulders now for services rendered in the past, such as 
bonds, pensions, and retiree health benefits that consume a large and growing por-
tion of the City’s annual budget” (quoted in Gelinas 2010).
Advocates of pension retrenchment were initially heartened by Judge McMa-
nus’ ruling that under Chapter 9 Vallejo had the right to renegotiate terms of its 
pension plan. When the initial work-out plan left existing pension levels in place, 
they viewed the Vallejo bankruptcy as a blown opportunity to establish a crucial 
precedent. On the other hand, the work-out plan does call for reducing health in-
surance subsidy payments to the cost of the basic Kaiser plan up to a maximum of 
$750 per month. These changes reduce Vallejo’s cost of retiree medical care going 
forward from $134 million to $35 million. 
A $100 million retrenchment in retirement benefits would seem to vindicate 
Vallejo’s decision to enter into bankruptcy, and so provide strong encouragement to 
many other cities in the state facing similar financial burdens to choose the Chap-
ter 9 option. In a future bankruptcy the city involved could seek to go beyond the 
Vallejo settlement and seek reduction in pensions as well as in medical care ex-
penditures. A potential focal point for renegotiating pension payments is the policy 
of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Fund, which assumes the pension obligation of 
bankrupt private firms. The PBGF currently caps the payments it makes to retirees 
of defunct firms at $54,000 a year. 
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In all likelihood, Vallejo is not the first wave of a coming tsunami of municipal 
bankruptcies. First, cities seeking protection under Chapter 9 may not receive it. 
They must first convince the court that they are indeed insolvent, which is not a 
straightforward exercise. There is no bright shining line demarcating a solvent city 
from an insolvent one, or a metric signaling that a pension fund has become too 
badly underfunded to ever be restored to actuarial health. In opposing the Vallejo 
bankruptcy, for example, the public employee unions identified monies in several 
special funds that could be tapped (and presumably repaid the day after tomorrow) 
in order to continue funding retirement benefits. 
Poor credit ratings are probably a necessary condition for declaring bankruptcy 
but not a sufficient one. Many local governments in California have bonds that 
are rated below investment grade, but are not candidates for bankruptcy. In order 
to go bankrupt a city must also demonstrate to the court that holders of a majority 
of claims have consented (we can assume that public employee unions will not 
so consent) or that they have made a good faith but unsuccessful effort to reach a 
settlement with claimholders. 
Bankruptcy is also ugly and expensive. Among other things, a work-out plan 
involves bondholders as well as pensioners; Vallejo, for instance, has not paid full 
interest on its bonds since going bankrupt, and is seeking a three-year deferral of 
interest in its work-out plan (Gelinas 2010). The Vallejo case thus shows that a city 
entering into Chapter 9 can expect large legal expenses, years of uncertainty, and 
little or no access to the credit markets. 
The most significant obstacle to Chapter 9 bankruptcy, however, is political op-
position within the city itself. Public employee unions can be counted on to fight a 
bankruptcy filing tooth and nail, as potential retrenchment represents not only a loss 
of benefits to their members but a dangerous threat to their reputation. As indicated 
earlier, if a union cannot defend the benefits won for previous workers who are now 
retired, its credibility with current workers would surely suffer. 
There is also a stigma attached to bankruptcy that makes it anathema to politi-
cians and voters alike. Pension funds for the employees of San Diego have been 
chronically underfunded, and the city has lurched from one budgetary crisis to the 
next (Erie, Kogan, and McKenzie 2010). In 2005 then City Attorney Mike Aguirre 
advocated a renegotiation of the terms of the city’s pension plans, or, failing that, 
filing for bankruptcy in order to avoid significant tax increases or cuts in public 
services. 
As it is written, however, a prophet is not without honor except in his hometown. 
Aguirre was defeated for reelection in November 2008 by an establishment Repub-
lican candidate strongly backed by the public employee unions. Even though it may 
well be in the best long-run interests of many California cities to file for bankruptcy 
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under Chapter 9, those who govern them, as well as the citizens who reside within 
them, appear to be extremely reluctant to go gentle into that good night. 
Repealing Ledyard’s Law: Constitutional Constraints on  
Stealing from the Future 
The constitution of the state of California is a long, complicated document com-
posed of 35 articles and literally hundreds of subsections. Much of it reflects policy 
approved over the years by the voters through the initiative process. According to 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977), this is not what a constitution should be; “genuine 
constitutional measures,” they assert, should instead be “rules designed to constrain 
the short-run expedient behavior of politicians” (p. 8). The three amendments to 
the constitution of California proposed below are in keeping with Buchanan and 
Wagner’s view of constitutions as constraints. More specifically, they are intended, 
at least in the realm of public employee compensation, to repeal Ledyard’s Law. 
First, the constitution of California should be amended to forbid the state of 
California, as well as all local governments within the state, from ever again issuing 
pension obligation bonds. Public officials have neither the time, the training, nor the 
inclination to successfully engage in risk arbitrage. Borrowing money to replenish 
underfunded pension funds is one of the most reckless of all budgetary ploys avail-
able, and, as some critics have noted, can be done without voter approval. Frankly, 
this amendment is necessary to make sure such bond issues are not put before the 
voters, as there is a strong possibility they would approve pension obligation bonds 
if given the chance to do so. Pension obligation bonds should be banned, period. 
Second, the constitution of California should be amended to forbid the state 
from guaranteeing, assuming, or subsidizing either the debt or pension obligations 
of local governments. In present circumstances this is such a bad idea that even the 
California State Legislature might refrain from considering it. But let’s not take the 
chance.
Third, the constitution of California should be amended to forbid the state of 
California, as well as all local governments within the state, from ever again offer-
ing their employees defined benefit pension plans. They could instead offer 401(k) 
defined contribution plans, which is the form of retirement plan offered by almost 
all private firms today. Adopting a defined contribution plan need not be a round-
about way of providing new employees inferior pension benefits. State and local 
governments, like many private-sector firms, could make these plans quite gener-
ous by matching employee contributions. 
Defined benefit plans also allow employees to make their own investments and 
choose the level of risk to which they are exposed, rather than be included with 
millions of others in CalPERS or similar one-size-fits-all retirement systems. But 
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make no mistake. Switching from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan is 
a fundamental reform. It means that state and local government employees would 
be compensated for services rendered at the time those services were rendered. 
What government officials and the voters who elect them would no longer be able 
to do is obtain services today in return for retirement benefits to be paid for the day 
after tomorrow. 
Three states—Alaska, Nebraska, and Michigan—currently have mandatory de-
fined contribution plans for state employees, and six other states provide optional 
defined benefit plans. It turns out that nearly half a million public employees in 
California already participate in a defined contribution plan (Chiang 2010). The 
proposed amendment would permit California state and local governments to adopt 
a cash balance plan such as that in Nebraska. This plan requires both employees 
and employers to make regular contributions into an account, guarantees an annual 
rate of return (5% in the Nebraska plan), but at the time of retirement the employee 
cashes out by either buying an annuity, taking the lump sum, or taking a series of 
installment payments (Snell 2010). 
Governor Schwarzenegger proposed conversion to defined contributions five 
years ago (Broder 2005), as advocated by Passantino and Summers (2005). This 
initiative was never placed on the ballot, but such a measure could be put to the 
voters in the near future. If so, available polling data indicates it would be favorably 
received, at least initially. A January 2010 PPIC opinion survey asked the follow-
ing question: “Would you favor or oppose changing the pension systems for new 
public employees from defined benefits to a defined contribution system similar to 
a 401(k) plan?” Californians deemed by the pollsters to be likely voters supported 
this proposal by a 70-21 margin (Baldassare et al., 2010). 
It will be decades, of course, before any of the benefits of these proposed amend-
ments are realized. For the next several years, as retirement benefit expenditures 
inexorably increase, state and local governments will continue to rein in expendi-
tures on current services and increase fees, charges, and fines wherever they can. 
Ledyard’s Law is one of the strongest of all laws governing human nature, so it may 
be wishful thinking to believe that these three amendments could ever be adopted. 
But repealing Ledyard’s Law, if only in the realm of public employee retirement 
benefits, is something of great value that we can bequeath to future generations.
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Notes 
1
 While most government agencies do not face competition in the marketplace for the goods and 
services they produce, they do face competition from other government agencies, as well as from 
private firms, in the labor market. A police department seeking to hire new officers, for example, 
must offer salaries and benefits that are competitive with those offered by other departments. This 
competition, however, acts to increase an agency’s costs of production, and not to lower the price 
they can command for their services. 
2 Some public employees have been allowed to include overtime, unpaid vacation, and sick 
leave to increase their final year’s salary so as to “spike” their pension payments. More generally, 
state and local governments have “picked up” some or all of employees’ pension contributions. In 
addition to reducing or eliminating employee contributions, employer contributions are counted as 
additional salary in the calculation of pension benefits. 
3 1014 equals one hundred trillion, but scientific notation is generally used when dealing with 
such large values. Besides being much larger in magnitude, the Social Security and Medicare Trust 
Funds face worse funding predicaments than public employee pension funds because they are con-
strained by law to invest all their assets in “special issue” U. S. Treasury securities. These debt 
instruments define safety, but correspondingly yield very low rates of return.
4 In 2004 the city of San Diego planned to backfill its actuarially unsound employee pension 
funds by borrowing $600 million in pension obligation bonds, but the adverse reaction of bond rat-
ing agencies blocked their access to the market and thus prevented them from doing so (Erie, Kogan, 
and McKenzie 2010).
5 I would like to thank Amy Monahan for pointing this out to me. 
6 Available data on union elections indicates that retirees are much more likely to vote than ac-
tive working members. In a 2007 New York United Federation of Teachers elections nearly as many 
ballots were received from retirees (22,500) as from active members (24,235) even though the latter 
group was far larger (Philips 2010). 
7 The city of Bell scandal might be an unusually flagrant case, but it is not difficult to find other 
examples. One hundred public school administrators in Illinois, for instance, are projected to receive 
over $1 billion in retirement benefits (Barone 2010). 
8 In an excellent review of private bankruptcy practice, Baird and Rasmussen (2002) observe 
that, for the most part, bankruptcy no longer functions as an institutional framework to facilitate bar-
gaining between distressed firms and their creditors. It has become instead a mechanism to formally 
ratify bargains already been struck prior to filing.
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